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REPORT AND INTERPRETATION OF THE WORLD CONFERENCE OF RELIGIOUS 
WORKERS FOR SAVING THE SACRED GIFT OF LIFE FROM NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE 
Moscow, USSR; May 10-14, 1982 
by 
H. Lamar Gibble and James E. Will 
Several persons long active in CAREE had the privilege of participation in 
the inter-religious conference on nuclear disarmament held in Moscow May 10-14, 
and we owe our colleagues and the readers of OPREE a description and interpretation 
of that event which can penetrate the miasma of media misinterpretation that has 
almost totally distorted the American perception of it. We also place in your ha�ds 
in this issue of OPREE the three documents that emerged from the work of the 
conference as Appeals: 1) An Appeal to the Leaders and Followers of all Religions; '  
2) Appeal to all Governments o f  the World; and 3) Appeal to the Second Special 
Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament. We think them worthy of study 
and discussion. 
Lamar Gibble, Peace and International Affairs Consultant for the Church of 
the Brethren, Elgin, Illinois, shares his experience and evaluation of the conference, 
as well as his critique of the efforts of the U. S .  government and media to distort 
and politicize it. James Will, Professor of Systematic Theology and Director of 
the Peace Institute at Garrett-Evangelical -Theological Seminary, Evanston, Illinois, 
shares his systematic reflections about the conference. 
H. Lamar Gibble 
When I accepted the invitation to attend the World Conference of Religious 
Workers at the invitation of Patriarch Pimen, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, 
I never dreamed it would attra.ct so much attention on the part of the U. S. media, 
or for that matter, the Reagan administration. But it did grab much more attention 
than any other similar disarmament conference initiated by Christian and/or 
interreligious leaders in recent times. 
In this report I will not bother to give details about the final formulations 
since they speak for themselves in the Communique, the Appeal to Leaders and 
Followers of all Religions, the Appeal to All Governments of the �.Jorld, and the 
Appeal to the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament-1982. 
In this report I will simply summarize my impressions, criticisms and commendations 
of the conference along with a few asides and happenings which color such an event. 
The conference followed the East European pattern of speeches and more 
speeches . . .  some mainly greetings, some quite focused on the theme, and some merely 
ideological rhetoric, grasping at an opportunity to give attention to one's 
religious group, denomination, or organization. That went on for most of the 
conference and many of the delegates were getting quite impatient by Wednesday when 
greetings \\ere still being interspersed with the main speeches, the conference was 
falling behind its schedule, and persons wanted to get on with the tasks in the 
working groups. Many were so impatient with the drone of the speeches and some of 
the rhetoric that they (we) began interrupting some persons with table pounding 
and groans when speakers went overtime or simply were scoring 'brownie' points 
with the Soviet government. I do not know if it was. reported in the press but 
there was not a polite and quiet acceptance on the part of the delegates of 
these few incidents of strident political rhetoric. 
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There were some notable and good speeches. The Patriarch's speech got 
quite a bit of attention in the news releases we received almost daily from the 
U.S. Embassy. It was probably the longest speech and was filled with biblical 
and theological wanderings but it concluded with a rather short section which 
could be characterized as political. It was this section alone, I think, which 
was picked up by the press and exploited although most of us saw this as mild 
political rhetoric and likely the minimum he could get away with in return for 
the approval of the state to organize such an-interreligious conference. 
Billy Graham's speech was well done, I thought. I was pleasantly surprised. 
While he was not as bold as some of us would have liked, he brought attention 
to the gravity and dangers of the nuclear arms race in an acceptable biblical/ 
theological context and, I think, was genuinely appreciated by most all present 
(Christians at least). Even his last minute insertion (not in the printed text 
of his speech) on human rights and religious liberty issues was set in the 
context of CSCE/the Helsinki Final Act and was tastefully and helpfully done. 
There were other rather good speeches too. One of the problems was that the 
good material soon became repetitive. I felt Dr. Arbatov, Director of the 
Institute for the U.S. & Canada of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, gave a good 
and balanced speech given the necessity of a pro-Soviet bent because of his posi­
tion. I was equally interested that he politely challenged Billy Graham's comments 
that linked 11the last, all destructive war, 11 with the 11second coming of Christ. 11 
Arbatov then went on to enunciate a position that might be closer to mine in that 
regard than to Billy Graham's. A Japanese woman, Michie Kurokawa, a survivor of 
. Hiroshima bomb gave a very moving account of her harrowing experience and made a 
plea for nuclear disarmament. Arie Brouwer's speech was short, powerful, and did 
honor to the U. S. delegation. JoAnne Kagiwada's speech (our current ICIC chair­
person) was warmly received, as much for her interpretation of the 1,000 cranes 
(folded paper cranes connected in lei form and given by the Japanese woman to 
Patriarch Pimen without explanation) as for her interpretation of the current 
status of the peace and disarmament movement within the U. S. churches. 
Although the conference was grossly monotonous for much of the time, it had 
its moments of stimulation, confrontation, and backroom negotiation. Two times 
the conference speeches were interrupted on behalf of the InterChurch Peace Council 
(IKV) of the Netherlands, whose representative came with the understanding that 
he would be able to address the conference, but then was denied the privilege 
and told by the chair that he would have the floor in the working groups. With all 
of the other speeches and greetings many of us could not understand why he was 
denied. 
Even given some real dissatisfaction on my part related to some of the struc­
ture and format of the conference, I came away with a quite positive overall view 
of the conference. The final documents, affirmed by consensus, were much better 
than I expected. They are no more 11radical11 or 11reactionary11 in my estimation 
than the proposals emerging from the disarmament movements in the U. S. and Europe. 
And the process of producing these final statements was not all that bad and 
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certainly not the "closed and Soviet manipulated" operation that the Western 
press presented it to be. At the presentation of and in response to the first 
drafts of these documents, there were over 100 verbal and written interventions 
for change or modification which were considered before the final drafts were 
presented in the closing plenary. It is my impression that there were genuine 
and successful efforts via the interventions, corridor lobbying, and consulta­
tions by the drafting committee to negotiate acceptable modifications of the 
texts. Therefore, when the final texts were presented on Friday there was a 
consensus to accept them as proposed. 
My main criticism and irritation related to matters not central to the 
conference but certainly related to it. My first irritation relates to the 
role the Reagan administration chose to play vis a vis the conference. Before 
I left the United States I had a long letter from Representative Fascell and 
Senator Dole, critical of the conference, filled with inaccuracies, and asking 
that I raise human rights and religious liberties issues in the conference. The 
day before I left I had a call from Hugh Simon of the Human Rights Bureau, 
Department of State, asking me to press the Soviet government while there to 
release the "Siberian Seven (now six) . "  In my absence another letter arrived 
from a different person in the Human Rights Bureau raising similar concerns. 
While in Moscow we learned that delegates from at least three other countries 
(we have documentation from Canada and the Netherlands) were called by U.S. 
Embassy staff in those countries urging them not to attend the conference . Even 
before we left the U.S. the press had reported the efforts on behalf of the 
Administration to convince Billy Graham not to go to the conference . While many 
of us have been to many other such conferences of rather major importance, 
never before have we had this type of pressure and activity on the part of our 
government. We also know that the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was "doing intelligence" 
on the conference as it was in its planning stages and that that information 
which was shared with Washington from these sources apparently was the basis of 
. some or many of the inaccurate statements in the government press releases and 
letters we received. (If the U.S. intelligence work in general is as poor as it 
was on this international conference, then what can we believe!) In short, I was 
extremely irritated by all of this and believe strongly that many of these actions 
were inappropriate and plans are underway to officially lodge this sentiment with 
appropriate persons, departments, and agencies of government. I came away from 
· 
the experience feeling that there seemed to be a profound ignorance on part of 
most of the embassy staff about the nature of the conference. Furthermore, there 
seems to be an abysmal ignorance of most staff at the U.S. Embassy of the daily 
life, witness, and history of the Christian Church in the U.S.S.R . It appears 
to me as if they are primarily interested in and tuned in only to the religious 
dissidents and the points at which the church is in tension or conflict with the 
state. Their knowledge and work, it seems, focuses primarily on matters which suit 
the U.S. political agenda. 
Another major irritation I had was with the press. No sooner had I arrived 
in Moscow than I learned that the Chicago Tribune Moscow correspondent wanted to 
meet with the three Chicago area delegates. From his opening questions in the 
interview it was obvious that he had predetermined his focus for the story. It 
would be about our reactions to Graham's presence, human rights concerns, and 
whether or not we felt we were being used as tools for Soviet propaganda. And from 
what we learned of the U.S. electronic and print press corps in Moscow, this was 
pretty true to form. What is deemed newsworthy is predetermined in advance and 
the questions (interrogations) never allow you to get to your experiences or 
the announced agenda of the conference. By the time I got back to the U.S. 
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I was so irritated by this and the loaded questions thrown at us that I responded 
to an AP interviewee's question, "Do you think Billy Graham was used by the Soviets 
for their purposes?'', as follows: "No more than you or the Reagan Administration 
have used Graham for your/their purposes." I have become more cynical about the 
press through this experience than I have ever been before. The things I have 
read since I have returned have convinced me further that they reported on their 
biases or on the basis of what would sell rather than having knowledge or experience 
of what the conference was about, what happened there, and what the final papers 
stated. The harsh critique of Patriarch Pimeq's address, I feel, could only have 
been written in ignorance (not having heard or read the speech) or with malice 
(intentionally distorting and taking a short statement out of the larger context 
of the speech). Furthermore, the U.S. press in Moscow seemed appallingly ignorant 
of the life of the churches in the U.S.S.R., maybe even more so than the Embassy 
crowd, and even more blinded by their focus on and contacts with the "dissidents." 
Still another irritant related to the focus on Billy Graham. Without it 
being his intention (I think and hope) the focus of the conference (nuclear 
disarmament) got lost in the glare of international attention given to "Billy." 
When it was announced many months ago that he might be invited, some of us raised 
this very concern and I have been told that the concern was raised during the 
planning process, but apparently "the Russians" really wanted him there. I am glad 
he went. I am happy he is concerned about nuclear disarmament (I  think genuinely 
so). But a price was paid in the process in that the media's focus shifted primarily 
to a person and not nuclear disarmament. Indeed if there was an "issue focus" in 
the media, it was on human rights and religious liberty issues and not on nuclear 
disarmament. Therefore, it is difficult to discern who won this round, the Soviet 
government or the U.S. government. Therefore, if some of these assessments and 
intuitions are correct, maybe Bishop David Preus's appeal in the conference to keep 
the conference within the confines of our religious concern and preventing it from 
becoming a "political forum," is an impossible dream. For how can we avoid the 
political dynamics and realities? And if we could, would not the governments and 
the press of both great powers impose their political agendas and biases on such 
an event anyhow? 
I came away from the conference again convinced that there is a genuine and 
abiding and deep concern for peace and disarmament on the part of the Soviet 
people and church leaders and that it is not simply being fabricated to subvert us. 
I came away convinced again of the continuing need for meetings and dialogue between 
Christians and other religious leaders in these types of fora. There are certainly 
better ways of working for peace in the West than through such a big cumbersome, 
and costly conference, but given the Soviet setting, I am not sure that anything 
much better could have been done than was done and so I am generally positive in 
my evaluation and estimate of the event and very happy to have been invited and 
a part of it. 
James E. Will 
I. Presuppositions of the Conference 
A. Shared presuppositions of the planners and participants: 
1. Human life is a sacred gift, which requires responsible safe­
guarding despite and in the midst of all historical ambiguities 
of national security, competing ideologies, and international 
injustice. 
2. The globally destructive charac�er of nuclear weapons requires 
dimensions of concern and action that go beyond the national 
to the universal. Though no one of the world's religions 
can speak for all of humanity, they all ground this universal 
concern and together may give it powerful expression. 
3. Not only the potential use of nuclear weapons but the very 
threat of s4ch use goes beyond all limits of ethical justifica­
tion. The Christian theological tradition's criteria for 
just war require opposition to nuclear weapons. 
4. The current deterioration of east-west detente, the failure 
of arms negotiations, the development and deployment of new 
weapons systems which destabilize the supposed balance of 
forces on which a precarious deterrence policy has been 
based, on the one hand; and the emergence of broadly-based 
peace movements at the time of the Second Special Session 
of the UN General Assembly, on the other hand, make this 
historical period a "kairos" for religious forces to express 
their commitment to disarmament. 
B. Apparent presuppositions of the Soviet Hosts: 
1. The sponsoring of such peace conferences is both an authentic 
witness of the peace concern of Soviet churches and other 
religious groups, and necessary for their legitimation in 
Soviet society. 
2. The spectacular form and international scope of such conferences 
impresses participants, especially those from the Third World, 
with Hoscow as a world center and the Russian Orthodox Church 
as an ecumenical center for world order. 
3. The ecumenical experience of the Russian Orthodox church, 
plus the growing world-wide consensus of the peace movements, 
make it possible to provide a more balanced and open process in 
this conference than has been true in some peace conferences 
previously hosted in the Soviet Union. 
C. Presuppositions of U.S. participants: 
1. The consultative planning process for this conference gives 
promise that the "mistake" of aligning religious forces with 
the official "peace policies" of the Soviet government, as 
expressed by previous religious conferences with venue in 
Moscow, would not be repeated in this conference. 
2. Concern for human rights and religious freedom in countries 
with communist governments, while legitimate and needing 
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to be expressed in appropriate fora, should not preempt 
this conference's proper focus on universal support for 
nuclear disarmament. 
3. The obvious tension that participation in this conference 
creates between the churches and the present administration 
of the U. S. government is accepted as an unintended consequence 
of the necessity of creating a universal witness against the 
nuclear arms race. 
II. The form and content of the conference 
A. The leadership of the conference in the Presidium and Steering 
Committee was relatively balanced, although there was more eastern 
than western representatives. Third World leadership was prominent 
and important. 
1. The Steering Committee, unfortunately, met only once during 
the conference. It did not decide the most difficult issue 
the conference faced in determining whether the representative 
of the Dutch Inter-Church Peace Council, Dr. Willem Bartels, 
would be allowed to speak to the .plenary. It is not clear 
how, and on what basis, the decision was made to deny him 
this opportunity, which he thought had been guaranteed him 
before coming. His withdrawal from the conference was 
unfortunate, and the ambiguity of the decision making process 
related thereto is a cloud on the democratic and open nature 
of the conference process. 
2. The Drafting Committee functioned in a creative and open way. 
The texts prepared beforehand were discarded. This had the 
disadvantage of a diverse group having to begin with blank 
pages. The result was something less than poetry, but is an 
authentic expression of the mind of the conference. Only two 
issues were negotiated "subrosa" because of the Muslim 
insistence on criticism of Israel's policies and the U.S. 
insistence on balanced references to U. S. and U. S.S. R. dis­
armament initiatives. Arie Brouwer and Bruce Rigdon of the 
U. S. A. played a creative role on this committee. 
B. The content of the papers prepared and (partially) delivered, on 
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the whole, was at a high level theologically, ethically and politically. 
1. This must be especially affirmed of Patriarch Pimen's address, 
which was maliciously reported in the U. S. press as "lashing out" 
at the U. S. In eleven pages of profound theological and ethical 
discussion, there was only one sentence commending the Soviet 
decision to introduce a moratorium on the deployment of medium­
range missles in the European part of the Soviet Union, and 
three sentences deploring the NATO decision to deploy American 
medium-range missles in Western Europe. The gentle conclusion 
of that only political paragraph was that this problem must "be 
settled at the table of open and candid negotiation rather than 
through further spiraling of the arms race. " 
2. The addresses of Arie Brouwer, Billy Graham and JoAnne Kagiwada 
of the U.S.A. all were excellent, despite the incoherence of an 
apocalyptic element in Dr. Graham's address that had little 
relation to anything else he said. 
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C. The most clearly negative content of the conference came in the almost 
endless series of formal greetings--forty in all--that were given during 
the plenary session. Though this is an old orthodox tradition, it has 
little justification in an ecumenical conference. They provide oppor­
tunity for some to enunciate political diatribes whose only apparent 
function is to be quoted in partisan .newspapers back home. Such 
"greetings" not only have a negative effect on the ecumenical ethos 
of the conference, bu� create such time pressures on the plenary 
· schedule that addresses commissioned at the invitation of the planning 
committee cannot be adequately del,ivered, and there is no time at all 
for plenary discussion. 
D. The conference thus woefully lacked opportunity for creative public 
interchange. From this standpoint it hardly deserves this honorable 
designation; there was all too little public conferring. There was 
genuinely creative interchange in private conversations outside the 
plenary sessions. But language barriers severely limit these 
possibilities because the elaborate translation facilities are 
available only during the formal sessions. 
III. The Results of the conference: 
A,· The documents adopted by the conference are good and useful. As Bishop 
David Preus said, they are "clearly even-handed." It is important to 
emphasize his evaluation, because his statement on the second day of 
the conference, when he took the chair to preside at the plenary, was 
widely quoted in the U.S. press: "the conference is in danger of 
becoming a political forum heavily tilted against the West." This 
was an appropriate warning at that time, particularly in response to 
some of the "greetings. " But at the end Bishop Preus said, the final 
documents "can be transmitted to any of our churches for study and action 
without apology." I think this was the evaluation of the entire U.S. 
delegation. These documents articulate the moral consensus of the world's 
religions opposing the nuclear arms race as a threat to the sanctity of 
human life. 
B. The media attention given to Billy Graham's participation must be judged 
ambivalently. Without him, U.S. media may have paid little or no attention 
to the conference at all. On the other hand, the focus on some of his 
ill-advised comments seriously distorted the reporting of the conference. 
The media focus became what our government wanted it to be: human rights 
rather than nuclear disarmament. This parallels the dichotomy in the 
Helsinki process, where the U.S. opposes our national concern for human 
rights to the Soviet concern for disarmament. These two concerns must 
' become compltmentary in the policies of both governments. 
C. U.S. churches should use the results of this conference as an important 
part of the process now gathering momentum in our society and churches 
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for peace and disarmament. The media distortion may be creatively used to teach 
that there is a positive correlation between detente, disarmament and the realiza­
tion of human rights. Public protests of human rights violations also have a 
proper place, but the churches must show that finally it is the increase of trust 
and the decrease of military tension which provides the better climate for internal 
change in any society. This is precisely the focus of The Churches' Human Rights 
Programme for the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, sponsored by the 
National Council of Churches in the U.S. A., the Canadian Council of Churches 
and the Conference of European Churches. 
